Abstract-How to allocate the limited wireless resource in dense radio access networks (RANs) remains challenging. By leveraging a software-defined control plane, the independent base stations (BSs) are virtualized as a centralized network controller (CNC). Such virtualization decouples the CNC from the wireless service providers (WSPs). We investigate a virtualized RAN, where the CNC auctions channels at the beginning of scheduling slots to the mobile terminals (MTs) based on bids from their subscribing WSPs. Each WSP aims at maximizing the expected long-term payoff from bidding channels to satisfy the MTs for transmitting packets. We formulate the problem as a stochastic game, where the channel auction and packet scheduling decisions of a WSP depend on the state of network and the control policies of its competitors. To approach the equilibrium solution, an abstract stochastic game is proposed with bounded regret. The decision making process of each WSP is modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP). To address the signalling overhead and computational complexity issues, we decompose the MDP into a series of single-agent MDPs with reduced state spaces, and derive an online localized algorithm to learn the state value functions. Our results show significant performance improvements in terms of per-MT average utility.
These trends are pushing NOs to look for more cost-effective ways to provide wireless services. Network sharing emerges as a disruptive mechanism to control both the capital expenditure (CapEx) and the operational expenditure (OpEx) [3] . This has started breaking up the vertically integrated nature of the conventional cellular system. Radio access network (RAN) sharing among NOs has recently received considerable attention due to the potential performance gain and inherent cost-saving benefits provided by utilizing economies of scale and avoiding duplicated investment on network infrastructure [4] , [5] , [6] . The worldwide combined CapEx and OpEx savings can be up to $60 billion through RAN sharing over a period of five years [7] .
However, the RAN sharing activities are mostly based on long-term business agreements between the NOs, and most existing network sharing solutions have the drawbacks of separating both data and control planes among NOs, accommodating customized wireless services, and capability of adapting to dynamic network statistics in practice. It is important to design a fundamental framework that can boost network performances and reduce NOs' expenses by allowing more efficient and flexible network sharing. Network virtualization is emerging as a key enabler for RAN sharing, with which the traditional single ownerships of network infrastructure and spectrum resources can be decoupled from the wireless services [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . Consequently, the same physical network infrastructure is able to host multiple wireless service providers (WSPs) [12] . Although network virtualization is a promising technology for next generation RANs, one unique research challenge lies in wireless resource scheduling across mobile terminals (MTs) of different WSPs. The diversified traffic from MTs in an RAN makes it difficult to achieve the optimal tradeoff between service flexibility and network scalability.
A software-defined networking (SDN) framework has been proposed to coordinate the complex radio access in cellular networks [13] , [14] . SDN simplifies network management by decoupling the control plane from the data plane and is a natural platform for realizing network virtualization in RANs. The authors in [15] , [16] presented software-defined cellular network architectures, allowing a remote controller to perform wireless resource slicing without modifying the MAC scheduler of a base station (BS). CloudIQ constitutes the first step towards wireless SDN by centralizing all data and control plane processing [17] . However, pushing all data processing to a central location imposes a huge demand on bandwidth and latency on backhaul. In [18] , the authors proposed a proof-of-concept illustration of a software-defined RAN architecture where the independent physical BSs are virtualized as a centralized network controller (CNC), which performs centralized control plane operations.
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with a SDNenabled virtualized RAN, where the CNC manages a limited set of channels and multiple competing WSPs bid the channel access opportunities for their MTs according to the network dynamics. The dynamics in a wireless network can be the results of the environmental disturbances and the interactions among the WSPs. For example, the packet arrival rates and the channel states can change from time to time due to the environmental disturbances. In the virtualized network, the CNC schedules channel usage upon collecting the bids from WSPs. The fairness during this centralized auction process is regulated through a VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) pricing mechanism 1 [19] . After receiving the channel scheduling outcomes, each MT of a WSP then proceeds to schedule the packets in the queue to optimize the expected long-term performance. Due to the competitive and stochastic nature of the channel auction and packet scheduling process, a general approach is to model the problem as a stochastic game [20] , [21] . Stochastic game has already been widely adopted in the literature to analyze the dynamic optimization problem of wireless resource scheduling [21] , [22] . Most of these results are, however, not scalable and with high implementation complexity, which hinder their applications in dense networks.
The contributions of this work are three-folded. First, we model the interactions among the CNC, WSPs and MTs in a SDN-enabled virtualized RAN with time-varying packet arrivals and channel states as a stochastic game, where each WSP aims to achieve its maximum expected long-term payoff. Second, due to the lack of complete information of the global network states and the control policies of all participating WSPs, we transform the original stochastic game into an abstract stochastic game with bounded performance regret. The decision making process of each WSP is modeled as a single-agent Markov decision process (MDP). Finally, we propose a linear decomposition approach for the per-WSP MDP to reduce the computational complexity at each WSP and the signalling overheads between the WSP and the subscribed MTs. Our proposed decomposition approach allows each MT to locally compute its individual state value functions. Without a priori statistical knowledge of channel states and packet arrivals, we propose a reinforcement learning [23] based algorithm for a MT to learn the state value functions by restructuring the immediate utility function in each scheduling slot. Compared to most existing works in literature, our proposed wireless resource scheduling scheme is simple and inherently self-organized, and can be deployed in dense networks with a large number of MTs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the system model and the assumptions used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we formulate the problem of wireless resource scheduling as a stochastic game and discuss the corresponding game theoretic solution. In Section 4, we propose an abstract game based model to approximate the stochastic game and derive a learning scheme to solve the wireless resource scheduling problem online. We present the numerical results in Section 5 to evaluate the performance achieved by our proposed scheme. Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusion. In Table 1 , we summarize the major notations of this paper.
SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 1 , we consider a SDN-enabled virtualized RAN, where multiple heterogeneous wireless services are supported over a common physical network infrastructure owned by a physical NO. The shared RAN covers a certain area. Different WSPs provide different wireless services, and each MT subscribes to only one WSP. Depending on the service types, the MTs belong to W groups, each of which channel allocation variable for MT n in cell k A k;n , A t k;n packet arrivals of MT n in cell k x x k;n , x x t k;n state of MT n in cell k r r k;n , r r t k;n channel allocation of MT n in cell k R t k;n scheduled packets of MT n in cell k at slot t P t k;n transmit power of MT n in cell k at slot t P ðmaxÞ maximum transmit power for MTs U k;n utility of MT n in cell k f k;n weight of transmit power for MT n in cell k a k;n utility price for MT n in cell k 
Let N k;w be the set of MTs in a cell k 2 K that are subscribed to WSP w. Accordingly, N w ¼ [ k2K N k;w denotes the set of MTs of WSP w, N k ¼ [ w2W N k;w denotes the set of MTs in cell k, and
denotes the set of all MTs in the network. The system is operated over discrete scheduling slots of equal time duration d (seconds) and the spectrum band used in the network is divided into J non-overlapping orthogonal channels with the same bandwidth M (Hz). Over the time horizon, the WSPs compete for the limited number of channels to serve their MTs. Each of them announces at the beginning of each scheduling slot t 2 IN þ to the CNC a bid, which is a vector b b t w ¼ ½n : w 2 W from all WSPs, the CNC schedules the channels and computes the payment t w ðb b t Þ for each WSP w. Let u uðb b t Þ ¼ ½u w ðb b t Þ : w 2 W be the winner determination vector at scheduling slot t, where u w ðb b t Þ ¼ 1 if WSP w wins the channel auction while u w ðb b t Þ ¼ 0 means no channel is allocated to the MTs of WSP w during the slot. For the channel scheduling at the CNC during a single slot, we assume that a channel cannot be allocated to adjacent cells in order to ensure that they do not interfere with each other, and in each cell, a MT can be assigned at most one channel and a channel can be assigned to at most one MT. Let r r t k;n ¼ ½r t k;n;j : j 2 J be the channel scheduling outcome for a MT n 2 N k;w at slot t, where J ¼ f1; . . . ; Jg and r t k;n;j ¼ 1; if channel j is allocated to MT n 2 N k;w at scheduling slot t; 0; otherwise:
For brevity, we may also write t w ðb b t Þ and u uðb b t Þ as t the constraints for a feasible channel scheduling decision at the CNC are given by 
In (4), ' t k;n ¼ P j2J r t k;n;j is a channel allocation variable that equals 1 if MT n is assigned a channel and 0 otherwise.
We assume a block-fading model for the channels within the spectrum band. In addition, we assume that the states of all channels experienced by a MT are identical during the period of each scheduling slot. Let H t k;n 2 H be the channel state of a MT n 2 N k;w (8k 2 K and 8w 2 W) at slot t, where H is the set of possible channel states for all MTs. Then H t k;n is quasi-static within each slot, 2 and is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) between different slots. The distribution of H t k;n is assumed to be not known a priori. At every MT, a data queue is maintained for buffering the packets that arrive at the end of a scheduling slot. 3 The arriving packets get queued until transmission and we assume that every packet has a constant size of m (bits). Let Q t k;n and A t k;n be, respectively, the queue length and the random new packet arrivals for MT n at slot t. The packet arrival process is assumed to be independent among the MTs and i.i.d. across scheduling slots. Like H t k;n , we assume that the distribution of A t k;n is unknown as well. Let R t k;n be the number of targeted packets that are to be removed from the queue at slot t. The number of packets that are eventually transmitted then is ' t k;n R t k;n , and the queue evolution of MT n can be written as
where Q ðmaxÞ is the maximum buffer size that restricts Q t k;n 2 Q ¼ f0; . . . ; Q ðmaxÞ g. The structure of one scheduling slot is shown in Fig. 2 .
Following the discussions in [24] , the required power for a MT n 2 N k;w (8k 2 K and 8w 2 W) to reliably transmit ' t k;n R t k;n error-free packets can be computed as
where & 2 is the noise power spectral density. We can observe from (7) that given H t k;n , the transmit power P t k;n is a strictly monotonically increasing function of ' t k;n R t k;n . Let P ðmaxÞ be the maximum transmit power for all MTs, namely, 2. In practical cellular scenarios, the channel coherence time is much longer than a typical scheduling slot duration [22] , [25] .
3. The developed wireless resource scheduling scheme in this paper can also be extended to the downlink case. k;n : k 2 K; n 2 N k;w are the channel allocation and the packet scheduling decisions for MTs of WSP w, and a k;n 2 IR þ can be viewed as the unit price to charge MT n for realizing utility U k;n ðx x t k;n ; ' t k;n ; R t k;n Þ from consuming transmit power to schedule the queued packets to avoid the packet overflows (due to the limited buffer size), which is chosen to be
In (9), h
; 0g defines the number of packet drops, and we assume that U k;n ðÁÞ measure the satisfactions of the buffer delay and the packet drops, respectively. The buffer delay can be termed as the immediate queue occupancy [26] and the packet drops occur when the queue vacancy is less than the number of arriving packets. f k;n 2 IR þ is a constant weighting factor that balances the importance of the transmit power consumption. With slight abuse of notations, we rewrite U 
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
In this section, we first formulate the problem of wireless resource scheduling (namely, the competitive channel auction and packet scheduling) as a stochastic game and then discuss the game theoretic solution.
Stochastic Game Formulation
We design a stationary control policy p p w ¼ ðp (4) and (5); (10) and results in the payment for each WSP w,
where Àw denotes all the other WSPs in set W without WSP w. Scheduling packets over the assigned channels leads to utilities, U k;n ðx x t k;n ; ' t k;n ; R t k;n Þ, 8k 2 K, 8n 2 N k;w . In particular, the VCG auction for channel scheduling at a slot t possesses the following economic properties:
Efficiency -When all WSPs announce their true bids, the CNC schedules channels to maximize the sum of valuations, resulting in efficient channel utilization. Individual Rationality -Each WSP w can expect a nonnegative payoff n t w À t t w at any slot t. Truthfulness -No WSP can improve its payoff by bidding different from its true valuation, which implies that the optimal bid at any scheduling slot t is b b
The VCG mechanism has been proven to be efficient for channel scheduling in one slot [28] . In the following sections, we put our efforts on investigating the potential of adapting VCG to the wireless resource scheduling problem in a virtualized RAN with time-varying network states, that 4. Other fairness rules (e.g., [27] ) can also be implemented and do not affect the proposed wireless resource scheduling scheme in this paper.
is, the problem of stochastic channel auction and packet scheduling, which is formulated as a stochastic game G to be detailed in the following. In the game G, W WSPs are the players and there are a set X jN j of global network states and a collection of decision-making sets, Y w , 8w 2 W.
The stationary joint control policy p p induces a probability distribution over the sequence of global network states fx x t : t 2 IN þ g, and hence a probability distribution over the sequences of per-slot payoffs F w x x t ; ' '
From assumptions on the channel states and the packet arrivals, the random process, x x t , t 2 IN þ , is Markovian with the following transition probability
where PrfÁg denotes the probability of an event, w : w 2 WÞ are the joint channel auction and the joint packet scheduling policies. Taking expectation with respect to the sequence of per-slot payoffs, the expected long-term payoff of a WSP w for a given initial state x x 1 ¼ x x can be expressed as
where g 2 ½0; 1Þ is the discount factor and ðgÞ tÀ1 denotes the discount factor to the ðt À 1Þth power. V w ðx x; p pÞ is also named as the state value function of WSP w in state x x under joint policy p p. Note that for the non-ergodic Markov system 5 in this paper, we define an expected infinite-horizon discounted payoff function in (13) as the optimization objective. Nevertheless, the expected infinite-horizon undiscounted payoff
can be approximated by (13) when g approaches 1 [29] . The aim of each WSP w is to find a best-response control policy p p Ã w that maximizes V w ðx x; p p w ; p p Àw Þ for any given initial network state x x, which can be formally formulated as
In stochastic game G, a Nash equilibrium (NE) is generally accepted as a solution concept to describe the most rational decision makings by the WSPs and is defined as follows. 
Remark 2. From the above analysis, we can observe that achieving the NE is still a technically challenging task. Each WSP w 2 W in the network has to know complete information of the global network dynamics (20) , 8x x; x x 0 2 X jN j , which incurs exponential computation complexity even for a network of reasonable size. More importantly, the private queue state transition probabilities and channel state distributions at other competing WSPs, i.e., the PrfQ 
ABSTRACT STOCHASTIC GAME REFORMULATION AND ONLINE LOCALIZED LEARNING
In this section, we elaborate on how to determine the bestresponse control policies in a computationally efficient way, by which the channel auction and the packet scheduling decisions can be made with limited information. More specifically, at each scheduling slot, the WSPs announce to the CNC the bids based on the their own local abstract network information. After receiving the channel scheduling outcomes from the CNC, the MTs decide the number of packets to be delivered. 5 . Due to the competition among the WSPs, the control policies, p p w , 8w 2 W, are not unichain.
Stochastic Game Abstraction
To avoid the high computational cost due to the large dimensionality of the network state space X jN j and to capture the impacts of other WSPs' decision makings in a non-cooperative networking environment, there is an imperative need for a WSP to approximate the inter-WSP couplings. One possible solution is to construct an abstract version of the original stochastic game G [31] . In an abstract stochastic gameĜ, all WSPs behave based on their own local network states and abstractions of other competing WSPs' local states. We denoteX w ¼ X w Â S w as the abstract network state space of each WSP w 2 W, where S w ¼ f1; . . . ; jS w jg is an abstraction of the state space X Àw of other WSPs.
Definition 2. For each WSP w 2 W in the abstract stochastic gameĜ, the abstract states regarding other competing WSPs are constructed according to a surjective aggregation function l w : X Àw ! S w . This implies,
Remark 3. The NE of the abstract gameĜ can be matched back to the original stochastic game G given the surjective aggregation functions for all WSPs [33] . But the mapping from X Àw to S w in (21), 8w 2 W, requires the complete local network dynamics from the competitors. Moreover, the state-of-art state abstraction algorithms [32] , which are based on various similarity criteria of defining the aggregation functions, are NPcomplete [33] .
Developing algorithms of constructing the surjective aggregation functions for such an abstract game requires the WSPs to exchange the local network dynamics, which is daunting for our non-cooperative scenario. On the other hand, the environmental feedbacks received by the WSPs (i.e., the payment (11) or the payoff (8)) also imply the behavioral couplings in the game G. We hence propose that each WSP w 2 W in the abstract gameĜ builds an internal S w by classifying the value intervals of the payments (or the payoffs 6 ), the procedure of which will be explained in Section 5.1. Herein, S w can be treated as an approximation of X Àw with jS w j ( jX Àw j. In line with the discussions, the WSPs' self-organizing behaviours are then not constrained by the form of l w as well as the X Àw . We will see in Section 4.3 that the statistics of S w can be learned from the history of the gameĜ. Based on the abstract network state spaceX w , we have the abstract action spaceŶ w , and the payoff functionF w in gameĜ is accordingly defined overX w andŶ w for each WSP w. 
6. The two criteria are equivalent since the only difference is the exact utility values from the MTs which can be obtained by their subscribing WSPs.
V Fig. 2 shows the similarity and difference between the games G andĜ.
For the purpose of theoretical analysis, we continue using l w for WSP w as the hidden function mapping from X Àw to S w .
In the mapping from original stochastic game G to abstract stochastic gameĜ, we denote " w ðs w Þ as the length of the value interval that is associated with a state s w 2 S w of each WSP w 2 W. We then have (23) , where p p andp p are two matched control policies, respectively, in games G and G, andx x ¼ ðx x w : w 2 WÞ. 
If the value intervals are of equal length, then " w ðs w Þ ¼ " ðmaxÞ w , 8s w 2 S w . As indicated by the lemma below, the expected long-term payoff achieved by WSP w from a control policyp p w in the abstract gameĜ is not far from that from the matched control policy p p w in the original game G. The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B, available in the online supplemental material.
Hereinafter, we switch to focus on the abstract stochastic gameĜ. Suppose all WSPs play the NE control policyp p Ã in the abstract stochastic gameĜ. Along with the discussions in previous sections, under the given expected long-term payoff functionsV w ðx x w Þ ¼V w ðx x w ;p p Ã Þ, 8x x w 2X w and 8w 2 W, the best-response abstract control policy for a WSP w satisfies (28) , 8x x w 2X w . From (28), WSP w is able to compute the optimal abstract control policy in the abstract game based on its local information.
Remark 4. Unfortunately, there are two main challenges involved in solving (28) for each WSP w 2 W: 1) a priori knowledge of abstract network state transition probability, which incorporates the statistics of channel state variations, the packet arrival distributions and the approximation of other competing WSPs' local network information (i.e., the statistics of S w ), is not feasible; 2) given a classification of the payment/payoff values, the size of local abstract network state spacê X w grows exponentially as the number of subscribed MTs increases.
Decomposition of Abstract State-Value Function
From the facts underlying in (20): 1) the channel auction and the packet scheduling decisions, which are made sequentially, are independent across a WSP and the subscribed MTs; and 2) the weak interactions exist in the packet scheduling, the perslot payoff function (8) 
described by (28) can be hence decomposed into jN w j þ 1 independent single-agent MDPs. That is, 8w 2 W,V w ðx x w Þ can be computed aŝ
8x x w 2X w , where the per-MT expected long-term utility U k;n and the expected long-term payment U w ðs w Þ of WSP w satisfy w ðx x w Þ : w 2 WÞ. The winner determination and payment calculation during the centralized channel auction process at the CNC leads to the derivation of (31) . Such a decomposition enables us to propose an online algorithm for learning the optimal abstract control policyp p Ã in the following section. It is worth to note that the linear decomposition in (29) is different from the linear approximation technique applied in work [22] , which ignores the coupling of channel auction among the participating agents. (1) Low computational complexity: In order to deploy a control policy based on the abstract network statê x x w 2X w , each WSP w 2 W has to store the abstract state value function with jX j jN wj Á jS w j values. Using the linear decomposition, only jN w j Á jX j þ jS w j values need to be stored. Moreover, the channel auction and the packet scheduling decision makings are simplified and depend on the limited feasible information at the WSP and the MTs, respectively. (2) Low signalling overhead: The linear decomposition motivates the WSPs to let their MTs locally store the individual state value functions U k;n ðx x k;n Þ, 8k 2 K, 8n 2 N k and 8x x k;n 2 X, which alleviates the signalling of channel state and queue state information between the MTs and the WSPs. The values of U k;n ðx x k;n Þ are then notified to the WSPs when deciding the true valuation during the channel auction.
On the other hand, the WSPs only keep the expected long-term payment values U w ðs w Þ, 8w 2 W and 8s w 2 S w . (3) Near optimality: The solving of a complex Bellman's Equation (28) is broken into much simpler MDPs. The linear decomposition approach is a special case of the feature-based decomposition method [34] , but provides an accuracy guarantee of the approximation of abstract state value function, the research of which has been extensively studied in the literature of reinforcement learning [23] , [34, Theorem 2]. Algorithm 1. VCG Based Channel Scheduling at the CNC at the Beginning of Each Scheduling Slot t 1: At current scheduling slot t, each MT n 2 N k;w (k 2 K) forwards the private information of ½U k;n ðx x k;n Þ; i k;n to its WSP w 2 W, where i k;n is given by (34). 2: According to the best-response channel auction policy p ðcÞ;Ã w , WSP w submits its bidding vector b b w ¼ ½n w ; o o w to the CNC to report its true valuation on requesting channels, where n w is given by (33) and o o w ¼ ½o k;w : k 2 K with each o k;w given by (32) . 3: After collecting bids announced by all WSPs, the CNC determines the auction winners u u and the channel scheduling r r w ¼ ½r r k;n : k 2 K; n 2 N k;w according to (10) to maximize the sum valuations, calculates the payments t w according to (11) for each WSP w, and then feeds back fðu w ; r r w ; t w Þ : w 2 Wg to all WSPs.
As addressed in Section 2, each WSP w 2 W has a valuation on requesting a number of channels for its MTs at each scheduling slot, which is assumed to be strategic in the channel auction. By decomposing the abstract state value function (29), we can now define the number of requested channels in each cell k 2 K as
and the true valuation of obtaining o o w ¼ ½o k;w : k 2 K as 
2X
Pr x x 0 k;n jx x k;n ; i; p
indicates the preference of a MT n 2 N k;w (k 2 K) between obtaining one channel or not, and 1 fVg is an indicator function that equals 1 if the condition V is satisfied and 0 otherwise. Such a channel auction decision from WSP w cares about not only the immediate revenue from charging the MTs, but the payoff realizations from the future interactions with other competitors. Note that when determining the bid b b w , the private information ½U k;n ðx x k;n Þ; i k;n at each MT n needs to be transferred to its subscribing WSP w. However, it's clear that the auction bids can be computed independently at the WSPs. With the definition of auction bids in (33) and (32), we briefly present in Algorithm 1 the design of the VCG auction based channel scheduling at the CNC at the beginning of each scheduling slot t.
Learning Optimal Abstract Control Policy
The optimal channel auction and packet scheduling decisions depend on both the expected long-term payments of WSPs and the per-MT expected long-term utilities.
Additionally, in the calculation of true valuation (33) for a WSP w 2 W at each scheduling slot t, the state transition probability, which is used to forecast the value of expected future payments, is unknown. We propose that each WSP w maintains over the slots a three-dimensional is simply based on the observations of the channel auction results. Then, the state transition probability at slot t can be estimated as
Using the union bound and the weak law of large numbers [35] in our considered stationary networking environment, we have 8'; ' 0 2 S w and 8i 2 f1; 2g,
for an arbitrarily small constant # 2 IR þ . And the values of U w ðs w Þ, 8s w 2 S w , are updated according to the reinforcement learning rule, 
where z t 2 ½0; 1Þ is the learning rate and the convergence of the learning rule is guaranteed by P 1 t¼1 z t ¼ 1 and
. Given that all WSPs deploy the best-response channel auction policies, the well-known value iteration [23] can be used by the MTs to find the optimal state value functions (30) . However, this method requires full knowledge of the local network state transition probabilities, which is challenging without a priori statistical information of channel state transitions and packet arrivals. To tackle this challenge, we define a post-decision state [36] , [37] based on the observation that the new packet arrivals are independent of the channel auction and the packet scheduling decision makings. At current scheduling slot, the post-decision state of a MT n 2 N k;w (8k 2 K and 8w 2 W) is defined byx x k;n ¼ ðH k;n ;Q k;n Þ 2 X, whereH k;n ¼ H k;n andQ k;n ¼ Q k;n À ' k;n ðp p ðcÞ;Ã ðx xÞÞp ðpÞ k;n ðx x k;n Þ. By introducing a post-decision state, we ?A3B2 tlb?> are able to factor the utility function in (9) into two parts, which correspond to f k;n U 
where
k;n x x k;n ; ' k;np p ðcÞ;Ã ðx xÞ ; p
Then (30) becomes,
From (40), we find that the per-MT optimal state value function can be directly obtained from the per-MT optimal postdecision state value function by performing maximization over all feasible packet scheduling decisions.
As we know, the number of new packet arrivals in the end of a scheduling slot is unavailable beforehand and so is the number of packet drops at the slot. In this case, instead of directly computing the optimal post-decision state value function as in (39), we propose an online learning algorithm to approach the optimal post-decision state value function by exploring the conventional reinforcement learning techniques [23] , [37] . Based on the observations of the local network state x x t k;n , the channel scheduling result r r ðmaxÞ ; 0g at current scheduling slot t and the resulting local network state x x tþ1 k;n at next slot t þ 1, each MT n 2 N k;w (8k 2 K and 8w 2 W) updates the post-decision state value function on the fly,
k;n x x t k;n ; ' t k;n ; R t k;n þ gU t k;n x x tþ1 k;n ;
where the number of packets to be delivered, R t k;n , during scheduling slot t is determined as 
and the value of the local network state x x tþ1 k;n at next slot t þ 1 is evaluated by (43). Therefore, the true valuation in (33) of a WSP w at the beginning of each slot t during the learning process can be replaced by
Pr s 
7. To avoid division by zero, each entry in a À11:23; À9:37; À7:8; À6:3; À4:68; À2:08g (dB). The number of arriving packets at a MT follows a Poisson arrival process, the average arrival rate of which is denoted by (packets per scheduling slot). Other general parameter values used in simulations are listed in Table 2 .
Experiment Results
We perform experiments under different settings to validate the theoretical analysis carried out in this paper.
Experiment 1-Convergence of the Proposed Wireless Scheduling Scheme
In this experiment, our primary goal is to validate the convergence property of our proposed learning based wireless scheduling scheme. We assume that there are totally J ¼ 20 channels shared by the MTs belonging to different WSPs in the network. At each scheduling slot, the packet arrivals for each MT are generated following a Poisson arrival process with average arrival rate ¼ 3 (packets per scheduling slot). We fix the mean of channel states to be H ¼ À2 dB for all MTs. Without loss of the generality, we plot the simulated variations in state value functions, U 1 ð10Þ (in simulations, jS w j ¼ 55, 8w 2 W) andŨ 1;1 ððÀ11:23; 5ÞÞ (ðÀ11:23; 5Þ 2 X), for WSP 1 and MT 1 2 N 1;1 ¼ f1; 2; 3g versus the slots in Fig. 3 , which reveals that the proposed scheme converges at a reasonably quick speed.
Experiment 2-Performance with Changing Packet Arrival Rates
This experiment tries to demonstrate the per-MT performance in terms of the average transmit power, the average queue length, the average packet drops and the average utility with different packet arrival rate settings. We choose for all MTs the mean of channel states as H ¼ À6 dB. The values of other simulation parameters are the same as in Experiment 1. The results are exhibited in Figs. 4, 5, 6 and 7. Fig. 4 illustrates the average transmit power per MT during the whole learning process, where the transmit power of each MT at each scheduling slot is defined in (7). Figs. 5 and 6 illustrate the average queue length and the average number of packet drops per MT, respectively. And Fig. 7 illustrates the achieved average utility per MT. Each plot compares the performance of the proposed learning based scheme to the three baseline schemes. It can be observed from Fig. 7 that the proposed scheme achieves a significant gain in average utility. Similar observations can be made from the average transmit power per MT in This can be explained by the reason that with the network settings by changing the average packet arrival rate in this experiment, the value of U ð1Þ k;n ðÁÞ for each MT n 2 N k;w , 8k 2 K and 8w 2 W, dominates the utility function U k;n ðÁÞ. As the average packet arrival rate increases, the average utility performances decrease. Since there are not enough channels for all MTs (i.e., J < jN j) during one scheduling slot, there might be the case that only some of the WSPs win the channel access opportunities from the channel auction, which gives rises to the number of packets remaining in the queue and the number of packets being dropped. Even if allocated a channel, a MT need to schedule more queued packets for transmission in order to reduce both the queue delay and the packet drops, but at a sacrifice of higher transmit power.
Experiment 3-Performance under Various Means of Channel States
We do this experiment to simulate the per-MT performance achieved from the proposed learning based scheme and other three baseline schemes versus the means of channel states. We configure the parameter values used in simulation as follows: J ¼ 30 and ¼ 3 (packets per scheduling slot). The average transmit power, the average queue length, the average packet drops and the average utility per MT across the entire learning period are depicted in Figs. 8, 9, 10 and 11. From the figures, we can clearly see that with a better channel condition on average, less transmit power on average is needed for packet transmissions. The reason behind this is straightforward, that is, since J > jN j, all WSPs can be guaranteed the requested number of channels on behalf of their subscribed MTs from the CNC. However, Baseline 1 cares only the channel states and does not take into consideration the number of queued packets, hence it realizes worse performance in the per-MT average queue length, the per-MT average packet drops and even the per-MT average utility. Overall, from Experiments 2 and 3, the proposed learning based scheme outperforms the three baseline schemes with respect to the per-MT average utility performance in all simulations. When making the channel auction and packet scheduling decisions following our proposed scheme, the WSPs and the MTs obviously strike a strategic tradeoff between the immediate payoff performance and the potential payoffs from future competitive interactions. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the wireless resource scheduling problem under a SDN-enabled virtualized RAN scenario. More specifically, the WSPs bid for the access to the limited number of channels on behalf of their MTs for packet scheduling over scheduling slots with the objective of maximizing their respective expected long-term payoffs. The CNC applies a VCG pricing mechanism to regulate the auction of channels at each scheduling slot. The problem is modelled as a stochastic game. The channel auction and packet scheduling decisions of a WSP require complete information of both the global network state and the control policy from all the other WSPs in the network, which makes the problem solving extremely challenging in a competitive network. By approximating the interactions among the competing WSPs, the original stochastic game is transformed into an abstract stochastic game, in which each WSP is thus able to behave independently. Furthermore, we decompose the per-WSP MDP into multiple single-agent MDPs to tackle the high signalling overheads and the costly computational complexity faced by each WSP in the abstract stochastic game. Such a decomposition separates the channel auction from the packet scheduling. Following this logic, a WSP makes the channel auction decision at each scheduling slot based on the expected future payments and the valuations received from all its MTs, while each MT determines the number of packets for transmission once receiving the channel scheduling outcome from the CNC. The experiment results clearly show that significant performance gains can be achieved from our proposed work. " For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
